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This paper examines the varieties of Islamism, distinguished those focused on the state, such as the Muslim Brotherhood from trans-state jihadists and non-political Salafists. They are seen as functions of state formation in the region. The paper assesses the changing fortunes of these rival Islamist movements before and after the Arab Uprising and in different Arab countries
Introduction: Islamism, the state and socio-historical changes
For a brief moment during the 2011 Arab uprisings, Islamism seemed to have become somewhat irrelevant. A year later, with the electoral gains made by many Islamists movements in the newly democratic atmosphere that then characterized the region, they appeared to be back on top of (and dictating) the political agenda. At the time of writing (early 2015), the wheel has turned again and neither democratic-nor Islamist-oriented institutional evolutions seem to be making headway.
A large (perhaps the largest) part of the apparent difficulty in delineating the Islamist factor relates to identifying and explaining political Islam/Islamism.
Whatever Islamism may be-and the perspectives that we will be proposing in the following are analytical distinctions, not the 'real face' of Islamism-the generic representations of the phenomenon that tend to dominate the political debate are commonly formatted to fit pre-existing explanations of political and institutional behaviour. 1 Beyond pointing out that political Islam has many faces, 2 we contend that making analytical distinctions within political Islam to reflect broader path dependencies is crucial to understanding the role, and fate, of Islamism during and after the Arab uprisings. Specifically, the many faces of Islamism reflect the different models of state governance that have predominated in the Middle East region (and beyond) over the years. This is particularly the case for those Islamists that we categorise as 'statist' to emphasise the close connection between national structures of governance and the strategies of activists in their particular socio-cultural and socio-economic circumstances. It is those statist Islamists that have, due to their aspirations to acquire state power, been most obviously affected by regime change, reform, or hardening during the Arab uprisings.
But Islamism is evidently not always best defined by its relationship with the state. For 'non-statist' Islamists, the uprisings and their aftermath hold a different significance, even though they too are affected by the changes in the relationship between the state and statist Islamists. We distinguish non-statist
Islamists by the primacy they accord to their relationship to the community instead of the state. This very broad category includes quietist grassroots movements inspired by salafism as well as violent transnational jihadi organizations, although important distinctions exist between them. Whether they seek to avoid politics altogether or have a vision of a political community not bound to the modern nation state, these groups compete with statist
Islamists for the Islamic high ground, thereby indirectly shaping national political landscapes. Crucially, these modalities of Islamist activism do not always correspond neatly to divisions between groups but can coexist within the same organization: the Muslim Brotherhood, for example, has strong statist and non-statist orientations, although the former commonly structures the latter.
Conversely, following the Arab uprisings, traditionally non-statist salafi formations engaged in state-level politics (most notably the Egyptian Nour Party).
In the following, we present an analytical perspective on the evolution of the relationship between Islamists and the state grounded on this distinction between two path-dependent configurations of contemporary Islamism. In section 2 below, we discuss how forms of governance and developmentalism influenced political Islam in the preceding decades. Then in section 3 we focus more specifically on the dynamics of statist Islamism in the context of these political evolutions before, during and since the Arab uprisings. Section 4 follows the same approach to elucidate non-statist modalities of Islamist activism. In section 5 we offer some explanations for the differential outcomes, particularly between Egypt and Tunisia, in the wake of the uprisings.
Islamism and evolving models of governance and development
Seen from the vantage point of the politics of the nation-state, the evolution territory, as the state relied more than ever on virtually unchecked coercive power to deal with the 'Islamist threat'.
Islamist Variations
In the following section, we track the evolution of statist and non-statist Islamist activism in the region in light of changing state dynamics. We do not claim that these trends encapsulate the entire complexity of contemporary Islamic activism or that the substantive differences we identify will necessarily retain their significance for all time. Our orientation toward national state institutions as our focal point is a heuristic devise enabling us to map the contemporary patterns of interaction between Middle East regimes and Islamist activism and understand how specific trajectories of state and Islamist governance can come together to either strengthen or weaken a polity.
Statist Islamism
For some scholars 'political Islam' refers to those groups and movements that actively engage with the state and national-level politics, unlike 'fundamentalism', which eschews formal politics and focuses on the social sphere. 14 Recognizing that 'the political' extends deeper than the state level, and also acknowledging the well-established conceptual problems with the term 'fundamentalism', 15 Development, was allowed to participate in formal politics because it was willing to recognize the legitimacy of the monarchy.
Over time, the possibility of aggregating demands for political inclusion increased as those movements 'moderated' their ideological programmes as a result of political learning and strategic adaptation to a partially free political environment. 18 In the three decades or so prior to the Arab uprisings, Islamist groups had softened core ideological goals (such as the establishment of an Islamic state) and instead embraced norms related to human rights and democracy. There was, however, a 'ceiling' beyond which Islamist movements would not moderate. 19 Although the high-profile activities of Muslim Brotherhood parliamentarians and the ideological innovations of 'New
Islamists' 20 contrasted markedly with the image of Islamism as a revolutionary, counter-system, force, this wasatiyya, or centrist, trend was by no means dominant within Islamism as a whole. Not only was it contested from within the Brotherhood and like-minded groups, producing internal tensions and schisms, but it was also rejected outright by grassroots movements, most notably salafis.
The non-statist trends inside and outside the Muslim Brotherhood thus structured, to a great extent, the political horizons of the statist ones.
Nonetheless, ideological and behavioural moderation enabled Islamists to sell their programmes to more secular-leaning constituencies as well as to a sceptical, if not Islamophobic, outside world.
Non-statist Islamism
Non-statist Islamism is not so much 'apolitical' as it is 'infra-political'--local-level organisational, preaching and charitable activity. 
Statist Islam and the Uprisings
Statist Islamism can, generally speaking, claim credit for the expansion of the political sphere in the Arab world, as a potential driver of democratization. In some cases, Islamists showed themselves to be highly adept at building structures of mass inclusion in authoritarian settings in which elite circulation was absent (Egypt). In others, this political effort could only take place after the fall of authoritarianism (Tunisia).
The uprisings of 2011 directly challenged the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes. They also challenged statist Islamism. They were able to mobilise significant numbers of people around slogans not related to religion or identity, something that struck at the heart of the 'culture wars' framework that had served to neutralise dissent for decades. Hopes were high that societal unity would carry the day. In mobilising on political and economic issues directly From an agent-centric perspective, it could thus be said that the strategies of the key actors of the Tunisian transition were conducive to a consolidation of democracy. But for Ennahda and it secular rivals to deepen their support bases and ward off the threat of 'culture wars', the daunting task of narrowing socioeconomic inequalities must be tackled. In such a case, statist Islamists move from purely cultural and moral claims as their main source of legitimation and become a party grounded on socio-economic policies that are drafted to appeal to a non-ideologically defined electorate.
Non-Statist Islamism and the uprisings
The post-2011 trajectories of salafis and jihadis in the countries of the Arab uprisings are also tied to both the general political evolution of the different states, and in particular to the success and failures of their statist Islamist rivals. When it is in control of territories, jihadism has proven to be an effective, and fairly economical, ideological and legal resource for groups seeking to enforce obedience and conformity among fragmented or traumatised communities, such as in the case of state weakening or collapse. The appeal of the jihadi model may relate to its simplicity and the ease by which it may be 'rolled out' in different contexts. 33 
